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ESSAY
THE REGULATION OF INCHOATE
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel Gervais*
ABSTRACT
In this Essay, I explain why and how certain technologies I
refer to as "inchoate" defeat regulatory interventions. I examine
the "law" of unintended consequences and the role of regulatory
ideologies. I suggest that traditional policymaking models, when
applied to inchoate technologies, do not adequately reflect the
risk of regulatory failure, which is proportional to the level of
inchoateness of the technology. I also consider whether the
regulation of inchoate technologies should take into account that,
and may in fact be undesirable because, some technologies (or
the use thereof) tend to self-regulate. Finally, I suggest lessons
that can be drawn from this analysis and present the basic
structure of an approach to the regulation of inchoate
technologies.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I wish to thank my colleagues
Margaret Blair, Paul Edelman, and Edward Rubin, who provided very constructive
comments on a previous draft, and Michael Vandenbergh and Lisa Schultz Bressman,
who convinced me to transform extensive class notes into this Essay. Thanks also to
Professor Glynn Lunney (Tulane), to Professor Ian Kerr (Ottawa) for his initial
encouragement to consider this model, and to the Law Faculty members at Haifa
University who attended the workshop where an initial draft of this paper was prepared
and provided useful feedback. I also owe a debt of gratitude to all the students who, over
the past nine years, suggested improvements to the paper, and to Kiernan Murphy for his
assistance in preparing the section on the precautionary principle.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Innovation matters. In global economic competitive terms,
each nation wants to maintain or increase its comparative
standing.! Governments want to get it right.! Does this mean
1. In the case of the United States, this means trying to maintain a leading
position as China, India, and others accelerate the development innovation potential,
leading to a global displacement of innovation to the East and South. See Jerome H.
Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the Developing
Countries Lead or Follow? 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2009) (discussing the development
of innovation-oriented intellectual property law and policy in most Asian countries).
2. According to www.whitehouse.gov, the "guiding principles" of the Obama
Administration's technology policy are (a) "Innovation in the Economy: Drive Economic
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that they need to regulate more? This Essay argues that they
must regulate certain technologies, which I will refer to as
inchoate, differently and probably less.' Put differently, when
the target of a possible regulatory intervention is an inchoate
technology, regulators should restrain their iegulatory impulse.'
Specifically, the two-prong thesis of this Essay is that some
technologies cannot be dealt with in the same way as other
fields of regulatory intervention and that the level of difficulty
in regulating an inchoate technology is proportional to its level
of inchoateness. The principal difficulty of regulating those
Growth and Solve National Problems by Deploying a 21st Century Information
Infrastructure"; (b) "Innovation in Science: Invest in Science and Science Education";
(c) "Innovation in Public Administration: Creating an Open and Secure Government"; and
(d) "Restoring a Culture of Accountability through Openness and Transparency of
Government Operations and Information." The White House Homepage, Issues:
Technology, http//www.whitehouse.gov/issues/technology (emphasis added) (last visited,
July 9, 2010). In remarks on the "Educate to Innovate" Campaign and Science Teaching
and Mentoring Awards, the President declared that "[wihether it's improving our health or
harnessing clean energy, protecting our security or succeeding in the global economy, our
future depends on reaffirming America's role as the world's engine of scientific discovery and
technological innovation." Press Release, The White House: Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks
by the President on the "Educate to Innovate" Campaign and Science Teaching and Mentoring
Awards (Jan. 6, 2010), http/www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-educate-
innovate-campaign-and-science-teaching-and-mentoring-awar (emphasis added). Presenting
its Innovation Policy, the European Commission notes along similar lines that "[i]n a
remarkably short time, economic globalisation has changed the world's economic order,
bringing with it new challenges and opportunities. Europe cannot compete in this new
environment unless it becomes more innovative and responds more effectively to
consumers' needs and preferences." European Commission: Enterprise and Industry
Innovation, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/index en.htm (emphasis
added) (last visited July 7, 2010).
3. There are countless studies of the impact of unsuccessful regulation, especially
when it reduces competition among stakeholders or prevents the entry of new players into
the marketplace: both factors that may lead to decreased innovation. The
telecommunications industry is a good example. While a number of countries had national
telecommunications operators (functioning as de facto or de jure monopolies),
deregulation was seen as a necessary step to promote innovation and competition. See
Justus Haucap, et al., Credible Threats as an Instrument of Regulation for Network
Industries, in DIGITAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: INNOVATIONS, NETWORKS AND REGULATIONS
171, 183-89 (Paul J.J. Welfens & Mathias Weske eds., 2007).
4. See David Ewing Duncan, What DNA, Patents and Lady Gaga Have in
Common, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/03/17/news/companies/
dna.patents.fortune/index.htm (noting that "[a] legal system that does not retain
flexibility in incorporating this rapidly moving science will cause confusion down the
line .. . it's crucial in this new age of genomics and molecular biology that we are as clever
about how we implement new discoveries as the discoveries themselves.").
5. This regulatory impulse by regulators is at all levels-Congress, state
legislatures, and also municipal ordinances and (executive) action by regulatory
agencies. The city of Cambridge (Massachusetts) attempted to regulate/ban recombinant
DNA research. See Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on
Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 736-37 (2003)
(discussing the scientific community's decision to self-regulate in order to prevent future
governmental regulation).
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technologies essentially stems from their ability to develop and
evolve independently of both regulation and market forces.
I argue that regulating inchoate technologies will have
unintended consequences that may defeat the intervention. In
particular, it may interrupt or divert potential chains of events
that might have yielded substantial benefits. Complicating the
equation further, inchoate technologies destined for mass uses
may influence the development of social norms concerning their
use and even their development.6 As social norm research has
shown, a gap between social norms and legal norms renders
designing an effective regulatory intervention much harder.!
Enforcing legal norms is a struggle when the disapproval,
ostracism, or guilt that results from failure to comply with the
legal standard of conduct is absent; in fact, disapproval, guilt,
and ostracism "can supplement or even completely replace the
threat of punishment as a means of ensuring that these rules
are obeyed."' In certain cases, that principle is reversed: a
technology may empower behaviors encouraged by social norms
in spite of regulation-technology in the anarchist's sphere-and
6. Examples include open source code and similar collaborative projects involving
hundreds of thousands of people contributing directly to the evolution of the technology.
See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select
Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 402 n.38 (2009) (describing a mix of legal and
social barriers to innovation); Charles R. McManis & Eul Soo Seo, The Interface of Open
Source and Proprietary Agricultural Innovation: Facilitated Access and Benefit-Sharing
Under the New FAO Treaty, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 405, 442-43 (2009) ("[Mlost
participants in the F/OSS movement use 'copyright ownership and contracts to enforce
social norms of sharing and openness.' Unlike proprietary software, in which copyright
is used 'to exclude,' however, copyright in F/OSS is used to confer a right 'to
distribute.'").
7. Sunstein defined social norms as "social attitudes of approval and disapproval,
specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done." Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914 (1996); see CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE
GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY: THE NATURE AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS 2 (2006) ("Given the
right kind of expectations, people will have conditional preferences for obeying a norm,
meaning that preferences will be conditional on having expectations about other people's
conformity."). Thus, if the user of a technology perceived that a significant number, or
even perhaps a majority of other users, behave a certain way when using the same
technology, a law prohibiting that behavior will clash with the social norm. Then again,
the equation is often simpler and devoid of a deliberative element: the technology makes
something fun or otherwise desirable possible, and the technology will then be used
without a conscious and systematic assessment of the situation-whether as a cost-benefit
analysis or otherwise. See id. at 4-5.
8. Christopher Jensen, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:
Copyright, Digital Technology, and Social Norms, 56 STAN. L. REV. 531, 535 (2003). On
the legitimacy of policy made through a process of democratic discourse, see JRGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF
LAW AND DEMOCRACY 457-60 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992), stating that
the legitimacy of a legal code is determined by whether those governed by the code have
an equal opportunity to participate in its creation.
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thus, radically transforms the traditional parameters of
policymaking.'
Against this backdrop, I suggest that policymaking efforts
targeting inchoate technologies must be recalibrated to take
account of the difference between the regulation of those
technologies, on the one hand, and other forms of regulatory
intervention, on the other. I propose an analytical model, not a
new regulatory theory." This model can be superimposed on any
such theory by suggesting a different approach to decide whether
to regulate an inchoate technology.
The dominant feature of inchoate technologies-as this
expression is used in this Essay-is their ability to evolve in
unpredictable ways and to spawn new chains of technological
developments. In his 1996 book Why Things Bite Back, Princeton
scientist Edward Tenner mentions dozens of examples of technology
evolving in unexpected ways-either because of bad design,
serendipity, or unintended findings-noting that in the area of
electronics for example, "strange things happen ... for which there
is no reason."" As to whether that evolution is generally positive, he
suggests that technology on its own does not usually produce side
effects that outweigh their positive effects (which he terms "revenge
effects"). 2 He notes that this tends to happen when technology is
anchored in laws, regulations, customs, and habits."
9. See HABERMAS, supra note 8, at 457-60 (noting that tensions created by
differences between laws and social norms can lead to more representative methods of
policymaking). Eric Posner has demonstrated that it is important for policymakers to take
account of the social norm/legal norm interface in the case of fiscal measures. See Eric A.
Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1791-92
(2000) (discussing how the government may promote compliance with tax laws by
manipulating social signals).
10. The four main regulatory theories are the Public Choice Theory, the
Neopluralist Theory, the Public Interest Theory, and the Civic Republican Theory. The
first three suggest various models of preference aggregation. While they agree on the key
role of interest groups, they differ on the role that the citizenry's preferences and the
perception of the public interest play in influencing regulatory outcomes. The fourth
theory focuses instead on shared values to inform the process. See Steven P. Croley,
Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31
(1998) (lamenting the fact that economists and political scientists fail to incorporate any
well-developed vision of administrative law and practice into their regulatory theories).
11. EDwARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BACK: TECHNOLOGY AND THE REVENGE OF
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 4 (1996).
12. Id. at 6-7. The French aphorism, "Les choses sont contre nous" (things are
against us) is another expression of this idea, which also serves as a cornerstone for
resistentialism, a tongue-in-cheek movement which postulated a fundamental, rather
than an accidental, opposition between man and the inanimate kingdom. See PAUL
JENNINGS, REPORT ON RESISTENTIALISM (1963), reprinted in PAUL JENNINGS, THE
JENGUIN PENNINGS 196 (1963). The aphorism is often attributed to French philosopher
Pierre-Marie Ventre. Id.
13. TENNER, supra note 11, at 7.
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Having provisionally defined the object of the analysis,
namely inchoate technologies, let me situate my analytical field
vis-A-vis related areas of inquiry.
There are literally hundreds of books, going back to Plato,
about how to govern. A number of those books are about
processes to set policy objectives. Sometimes referred to as
"policy analysis," this process consists of formulating alternative
policy objectives for decisions by the legislature; that is,
intervention options that will be shaped by the "political
stream."" This is the essence of the political process; it is also not
what this Essay is about. Then there are also studies of the
legislative drafting process, and again this is not my focus."
There is, however, a key connector that links these two parts of
the policymaking and implementation process; namely how to
identify policies that will effectively implement the policy
objectives, while taking account of the nature of the regulatory
target." That connector is the focus of this paper when the target
is an inchoate technology.
I should add that while the analysis of regulatory failure is
not new-it is risky and difficult to regulate any "market,"
"behavior," or risk generally-this Essay argues that the
likelihood of mistakes-which can be made in any regulatory
intervention-is significantly higher when one ignores the
inchoate nature of certain technologies, or views it rather naively
as another facet of the market or user behavior.'" Inchoate
technologies are neither neutral nor a simple part of the
"market."9 They have a life of their own and policymakers must
take that factor into account.
14. See, e.g., CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 3-4 (1968)
(describing, for example, one approach to implementing policy objectives through a sequence
of steps: "(a) preliminary appraisal of or inquiry into the problem; (b) identification of goals or
objectives; (c) canvassing of possible policies to achieve the goals; and, (d) choice or design").
15. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 145-63
(2d ed. 1995) (stating that policy goals come from many sources, including the national
mood, organized interests, election repercussions, and the orientation of elected officials).
16. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575 (2002) (discussing the
legislative drafting process in the Senate Judiciary Committee).
17. That is the object of the regulation-in our case an inchoate technology or the
behavior of users of that technology.
18. See MALCOM K SPARROW, THE REGULATORY CRAFI: CONTROLLING RISKS,
SOLVING PROBLEMS, AND MANAGING COMPLIANCE 282-90 (2000).
19. See HUMBERTO R. MATURANA & FRANCISCO J. VARELA, AUTOPOIESIS AND
COGNITION: THE REALIZATION OF THE LIVING 78-80 (D. Reidel Publ'g Co. 1980) (1972)
(discussing the interconnected and variable nature of autopoietic, or "living," machines).
Technology's "life of its own," the fact that it creates winners and losers in a
Schumpeterian process, is well documented in social science research. Maturana and
670 [ 47:3
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My analysis proceeds as follows: I will review, first, the
dominant regulatory ideologies, essentially to show that they are
poor guides when regulating inchoate technologies. In Part II, I
define the notion of inchoate technology. In Part III, I situate the
approach to the regulation of inchoate technology vis-a-vis
regulatory ideologies. In Part IV, I explicate the ability of
inchoate technologies to react and possibly defeat regulation.
This reaction is amplified when the legal norm is divorced from
the social norm. In Part V, I review a major pitfall of regulation
as it applies (or not) to the regulation of inchoate technologies;
namely, the 'law" of unintended consequences. In Part VI, I
discuss the ability of technologies to self-regulate, which may
negate the need for outside norms. In Part VII, I discuss the
precautionary principle, which I see as the best, and possibly the
only, coherent analytical framework to regulate inchoate
technologies. Finally, in Part VIII, I present the outcomes of the
analysis and the structure of a regulatory model that follows
from those conclusions.
II. INCHOATE TECHNOLOGIES
A. Definitional Indices
I use the term "inchoate" in this Essay to reflect the fact that
certain technologies are far from completely developed and
suggest that this differentiates them from more stable ones.20 The
Varela suggested that one could apply to certain "machines" properties of living systems
and develop in part at least from endogenous factors rather than external constraints or
stimuli. Id. at 78. Naturally, in the TechnoPolicy model, technology is not part of a closed
system. Both endogenous and exogenous factors are considered. See also Marylaine Block,
Introduction to NET EFFECTS: How LIBRARIANS CAN MANAGE THE UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERNET 1, 1 (Marylaine Block ed. 2003) ("Any technology upsets
applecarts, both by intention and through unintended side effects; the more powerful the
technology, the more powerful those side effects are.").
20. The term was used by a number of previous authors, though not defined. See
Gregory D. Foster, Integrating the U.S. Industrial Base: Strategic Necessity for America's
Future, 19 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 133, 144 (1995) ("One example, from among many
that could be cited, of an inchoate technology being developed for commercial markets
that could have valuable military uses is the computer-based speech-translation system
(or universal translator)."); Thomas R. Mclean, Cybersurgery: Innovation or a Means to
Close Community Hospitals and Displace Physicians?, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 495, 497 (2002) ("[Clybersurgery, as with any inchoate technologic innovation, is
associated with a plethora of sociologic, and hence legal, questions."); Brent E. Newton,
The Legal Effect of Government Contractor Teaming Agreements: A Proposal for
Determining Liability and Assessing Damages in Event of Breach, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1990, 1995 n.21 (1991) (referring to Air Technology Corp. v. General Electric Corp., 199
N.E.2d 538, 546 (Mass. 1964) in which the court noted that a "largely unspecified, untested
nuclear detection system' project was subject to the 'changing ideas of the Air Force'"); Kirk
Tarman, Note, The Internet Dilemma: The Virtual Censors-Governmental Control of
671
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inchoateness can apply to organic changes to the technology or to
its use. To take the dissemination of copyrighted content on the
Internet as an example, the technology itself (how people connect
to the network and with which device(s)) is still relatively
inchoate; the ways in which users access, use, and transform that
content is more inchoate still and fast developing.2'
While an inchoate technology is usually a new one,
inchoateness involves several features in addition to novelty.
While I do not pretend to offer watertight definitional
boundaries, there are a number of indices of inchoateness of a
technology that one can look for. As just mentioned, novelty is
the first sign of inchoateness and an obvious starting point.
There is undoubtedly a temporal component. Yet, it is not just a
measure of time that has elapsed since the technology was
invented because the rate of transition to "choate" status will
vary for each technology. Still, a fledgling technology is typically
highly inchoate; as it progresses, it (or some of its applications)
should become more stable and the social norms surrounding its
use easier to identify.22 With progressive integration into the
social fabric, the predictability of the technology will increase and
its level of inchoateness decrease. In terms of regulatory
intervention, the target will thus tend to stabilize over time.
Conversely during its inchoate phase, the development of the
technology will typically be driven as much by user response as
by unforeseen applications and evolutions.23
Juvenile Access to the Internet, 19 J. JUV. L. 421, 428 (1998) ("With the advent of the
Internet and its vast impact upon our society, the courts must carefully tread between
regulation and stifling an inchoate technology."); see also Deborah A. Lathen, Broadband
Today: A Staff Report to William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications
Commission, on Industry Monitoring Sessions Convened by Cable Services Bureau (Oct.
1999), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf ("[B]roadband is an
awesome, yet largely inchoate, technology that will bring the Internet and advanced
services to millions of Americans.").
21. See Robert C. Piasentin, Unlawful? Innovative? Unstoppable? A Comparative
Analysis of the Potential Legal Liability Facing P2P End-Users in the United States,
United Kingdom and Canada, 14 INT'L J.L. & INFo. TECH. 195, 212-13 (2006) (discussing
the difficulties encountered by owners when they attempted to prevent p2p file sharing).
22. See W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND How IT
EVOLVES 163-65 (2009) ("[Ilndividual technologies and bodies of technology go through
predictable phases as they mature. . . . [Tihey do evolve in the sense that each
establishes a line of descent, with all the branching into different 'subspecies' or
different subdomains . . . ."). Of course the phases are predictable, but in the initial
phases of new (inchoate) technology, what is predictable is precisely the unpredictable
way in which the technology will branch out. This is referred to below as the "chain(s)
of events" that can be altered by regulation, often as an unintended consequence. Supra
Part V.
23. See Tarman, supra note 20, at 428-29 (discussing the struggle courts face in
regulating the Internet in light of its unforeseen use as a source of pornography).
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More importantly, an inchoate technology's future is
unpredictable, as is the role of existing (and the emergence of
radically new) market players and the reaction of potential
users.24 No one knew in the 1920s whether airplanes would really
be commercially viable for passenger travel, but everyone could
picture how they would function if they were." On the other
hand, when Michael Faraday invented the electromagnet, no one
knew what it would be used for.26
Third, social norms concerning an inchoate technology are
usually in flux and tend to evolve rapidly." As noted above, this
means that the difficulty of the moving technological target is
compounded by social norms that may try to circumvent the
regulation, especially for mass use technologies.28
Fourth, another feature of inchoateness is whether the
technology is being developed by existing firms as part of an
existing product line, or whether it is being developed by a host of
small, start-up firms as an independent technology.2" A
constellation of unknown start-ups seems to present a greater
regulatory challenge than asking already highly regulated
companies to adapt to regulation.
24. Governments often try, and fail, to push a particular technology to market,
possibly impeding the development of better ones and not promoting the development of
chains of events that would be more productive. I return to this below. See ARTHUR, supra
note 22, at 163 ("There is always a temptation for governments to pursue science with
commercial aims in view. But this rarely works. Had there been a stated purpose to
quantum physics in the 1920s, it would have been deemed a failure. And yet quantum
physics has given us the transistor, the laser, the basis of nanotechnology, and much else
besides. Building a capacity for advanced technology is not like planning production in a
socialist economy, but more like growing a rock garden. Planting, watering, and weeding
are more appropriate than five-year plans.").
25. See Justin T. Barkowski, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the Next
Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories,
and-Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 247, 253-60 (2010) (describing the origins of the
regulated airline market starting in 1916).
26. In a famous exchange, Faraday received British Prime Minister William
Gladstone and then, as former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher explains, "demonstrated
his remarkable new invention, the electric generator. Afterwards he waited for the Prime
Minister's response, expecting him to be suitably impressed but there was silence.
Eventually Gladstone did speak, 'Tell me Mr Faraday' he said, 'will this new discovery of
electricity be of any practical use?'. To which the indignant but quick-witted Faraday replied
'Oh yes Prime Minister. One day you will tax it!'" See Rt. Hon. Baroness Margaret Thatcher,
Speech in Bermuda to a Luncheon Organised by Sir John Swan, (Aug. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=109301.
27. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 948 (discussing the difficulties of governmental
interference with social norms to effect positive change).
28. See id. at 914-24 (discussing how social norms can affect collective action and
movements for legal and social change). I discuss the interaction between technology,
social norms, and regulation in Part IV.
29. Naturally, those new technologies may have Schumpeterian impacts on existing
products.
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Fifth and finally, a feature of inchoate technology is precisely
the risk of regulating it. This could be either the level of risk or the
nature of the risk. To take an example of each: regarding the latter,
everyone could guess the risk of imposing safety regulation on
passenger airplanes in the 1920s, when the first statutes were
passed; it was that passenger air travel wouldn't become
commercially viable." On the other hand, banning an inchoate
technology such as stem cell research or cold fusion creates a high
risk of regulatory failure because no one can say with any degree of
certainty where such research might lead-that is, which chains of
events may be prevented or diverted by regulation.'
B. Discussion
Four observations are in order concerning the notion of
inchoate technology. First, the definitional boundaries outlined in
the previous paragraphs may apply more readily to consumer (or
mass market) technologies because a vast number of users may
be more apt to develop behavioral norms concerning its use." Yet,
this is true also of technologies that are used within a particular
community with its own norms.
Second, while I would grant that a technology that requires
expensive labs may be an easier physical enforcement target for
30. Barkowski, supra note 25, at 253.
31. This led Professor Abramovicz to argue for simplified regulation, using cold
fusion as an example:
A happy consequence of regulatory simplification is a reduced danger that
regulations will become obsolete. As long as a predictive mechanism occurs
continuously, predictors will have incentives to update their predictions. Insurance
companies pricing bank risk, for example, would have an incentive to respond to
relevant changes in the economic environment. Similarly, participants in an
information market about scientific propositions could profit by trading on news
affecting the validity of scientific propositions. So, if cold fusion were suddenly
conclusively proven impossible, a government relying on the information market
could stop funding such research without any separate analysis of its own.
Michael Abramovicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 85 (2006).
32. A reference to technological determinism will offer a counterfactual for the
argument made here, according to which technology drives the development of social
structure and cultural values. See, e.g., THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN
MODERN CIVILIZATION 53 (2007) (arguing the traditional attitude is to be submissive
towards the laws of natural science). In Part II, I will take a different view; namely that
society (and specifically demand for certain technological applications) shapes technology.
This may be closer to the notion that technological "artifacts" correlate with particular
kinds of social and political relationships. See, e.g., LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND
THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY 52-55, 99 (1986)
(arguing that technology is a powerful force that gives meaning and direction to our lives
and shapes conditions of power, authority, freedom, and social justice).
33. Gary Burnett et al., Small Worlds: Normative Behavior in Virtual Communities
and Feminist Bookselling, 52 J. AM. SoC'Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 536,538-39 (2001).
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regulators (that is, in terms of finding its developers to enforce a
regulation), it may not be easier to achieve a desired regulatory
outcome because the unpredictability that accompanies its
inchoateness remains." That said, a software-based inchoate
technology may be more nimble and, in the final analysis, a
prime target for the model outlined in this Essay."
Third, a "technology" is more properly understood in the
context of my analysis as a particular technological application,
as opposed to what might more appropriately be called
technological "domains.""
Fourth and finally, the process by which a technology
becomes more choate is precisely that, a process. A technology
does not move from one state to the next in a day. The level of
inchoateness will tend to decrease over time as the technology
becomes more stable and predictable."
Historically, technologies that are now well established were
inchoate, even if only briefly. Airplanes were inchoate before
World War I, and television was inchoate in the 1930s, as were
automobiles and movies in the 1890s." I suggest below that for
34. Hence the point about technologies developed by several start-ups instead of
well-established companies. See infra Part III.A (noting that the development of inchoate
technologies often outpaces regulatory efforts).
35. Yet, a number of commentators have argued that even technologies such as
those in the domain of nanotechnology which cannot be developed by consumers in the
same way as, say, source code, must be regulated in a way which reflects societal
perceptions. See, e.g., Emilio Mordini, Nanotechnology, Society and Collective Imaginary:
Setting the Research Agenda, in NEW GLOBAL FRONTIERS IN REGULATION: THE AGE OF
NANOTECHNOLOGY 29, 30 (Graeme Hodge, Diana Bowman & Karinne Ludlow, eds., 2007)
(defining social imaginary as "a filter for new information ... the lens through which
people perceive the world" and a source of collective action, including technological
regulation). The notion of social imaginaries was explored in depth by Charles Taylor.
CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 23-24 (2004). I discussed some of the
lessons intellectual property policymakers can draw from that notion in Daniel Gervais,
Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full TRIPS Implementation,
77 FORDHAm L. REV. 2353, 2367-68 (2009).
36. ARTHUR, supra note 22, at 163-65 (defining a "domain"-and contrasting that
notion with "individual technologies"). Arthur explains that domains crystallize "around a
set of phenomena loosely understood or around a novel enabling technology, and build
organically upon the components, practices and understandings that support these. And
as the new domain arrives, the economy encounters it and alters itself as a result." Id. I
would argue that the verb could be in straight active form: the technology alters the
economic (market).
My point is that, while a new technological domain may at first overlap almost
entirely with a single technological application (say, the first nanotechnology ever created
in a laboratory was the entire domain of nanotechnology at that point in time), as new
applications develop, they become individual regulatory targets-unless of course the
regulator tries to ban the entire domain.
37. Marc B. Sokol, Adaptation to Difficult Designs: Facilitating Use of New
Technology, 8 J. Bus. & PSYCHOL. 277, 279-80 (1994).
38. AN ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (Ian McNeil ed., 1990).
HeinOnline  -- 47 Hous. L. Rev. 675 2010-2011
676 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [47:3
any such new technology, market regulation during the initial,
inchoate stage is highly risky, and unintended consequences are
extremely likely." If the technology does not need to be regulated
under a sound application of the precautionary principle, then
any impulse to impose technology-specific regulation is probably
best resisted.4 0 Conversely, because risks may emerge during the
inchoate stage, a nimble regulatory approach effected by courts
or regulatory agencies may work best.4'
The analytical model I propose below does not consider
technology regulation as justified because costs are likely lower
than expected benefits, in part because (a) the value of the
prediction when applied to an inchoate technology is dubious;
(b) because there are rarely feedback loops to adjust the
regulatory framework if the target is missed; and (c) the
unintended consequences are rarely factored in.42 Instead, I
suggest that an optimal model refrains from shaping the future
of an inchoate technology or its market relevance unless the
precautionary principle applies.
39. See infra Part V (asserting that the unpredictable nature of inchoate
technologies makes the impact of regulation almost impossible to predict).
40. See infra Part VII.B (demonstrating a proper application of the precautionary
principle to inchoate technologies).
41. This is not the same as cost-benefit analysis. See infra Part IV (arguing that
because inchoate technologies are constantly evolving, regulation is often outdated
before it is put in place). Technologies such as use of asbestos, Thalidomide, etc. might
have been regulated much more effectively under such an approach. One author
explains:
[A]sbestos is not a wholly isolated case. The use of dangerous workplace
materials and production of some products with latent defects or perceived
health risks is inevitable in a vibrant market economy. Examples abound: coal,
DDT, Thalidomide, lead, mercury, tobacco, intrauterine devices, and polyvinyl
chlorides....
... These dangers can create huge classes of claimants, seeking
compensation for injuries, lost wages, and diminished quality of life as well as
retribution for any corporate wrongdoing that contributed to their losses. These
claims, in turn, will raise the issues of whether courts should try to address the
underlying issues or defer to other forums.
On this central issue of institutional choice, the rise of asbestos litigation
suggests two main lessons. First, contemporary legal process analysis implies
that there is a choice of social ordering mechanisms, albeit imperfect ones. In
reality, some options will be off the table as a practical matter. Indeed, in a
lawmaking process riddled with veto points and supermajority requirements
such as the filibuster in the Senate, legislation is often out of reach. As a result,
the initial choice facing judges is often not litigation versus other modes of social
ordering; it is litigation or nothing at all.
Jeb Barnes, In Defense ofAsbestos Tort Litigation: Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a
World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy-Making Responsibility, 34 L. &
Soc. INQUIRY 5, 21-22 (2009).
42. See infra Part VIII.B (proposing a new regulatory approach for inchoate
technologies).
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One might counter that inchoate technologies are more
malleable and can be shaped by regulation without the
significant damage to the economy that might occur once the
technology generates significant levels of employment and
investment. The point concerning risk to the economy is well
taken, but I maintain that the risk of failure (that is, the absence
of correlation, let alone a match, between the regulatory objective
and the actual outcome once the regulation is implemented) is
much higher when dealing with an inchoate technology.
III. REGULATORY IDEOLOGIES
At its most basic level, policymaking is often informed by the
perceived desirability, or absence thereof, of a regulatory
intervention.43 Whether to try to direct the market or only fix a
failed one is a long-standing debate-one that I do not plan to
discuss here." It is fair to say, however, that this traditional
political (sometimes dubbed "Left-Right") "axis view" and the
major approaches that are derived from it are overrated and, at
best, a very rough guide for policymakers when it comes to
inchoate technologies.45
43. According to public choice theorists, the market is, in fact, the model for
regulatory interventions. Croley, supra note 10, at 34, explains that, "The public choice
theory of regulation . .. treats legislative, regulatory, and electoral institutions as an
economy in which the relevant actors-including ordinary citizens, legislators, agencies,
and organized interest groups most affected by regulatory policies-exchange regulatory
'goods,' which are 'demanded' and 'supplied' according to the same basic principles
governing the demand and supply of ordinary economic goods."
44. For an example as to how law can affect the economy, see Jim Chen & Daniel J.
Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L.
REV. 1315, 1319-20 (1995), where they note that law can be used to both nurture and
restrain national economies.
45. That is, to simplify, one could call the "Left-Right" debate on the place of the
public sector in the economy. My attention was drawn to the Wikipedia entry on "Left-right
politics," which puts it succinctly as follows: "The contemporary Left usually defines itself
as promoting government regulation of business, commerce and industry . ... The
contemporary Right [in the United States] . . . usually defines itself as promoting
deregulation of banking, commerce and industry." Wikipedia.com, Left-Right Politics,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left-rightpolitics (last visited July 6, 2010). Hilpert notes
that the distinction does not necessarily hold when applied to technological innovation
even as an ideological matter:
Having identified the particular logic of the innovation process under
capitalism and, apparently determined that it is based upon value-free
scientific progress, the conservatives can proclaim themselves as the natural
allies of progress and declare that future social welfare necessitates societal
adjustments to the needs of innovation. Social-democratic ideas of applying
techno-scientific progress and innovation to broader social problems appear to be
inappropriate in this depoliticized situation... . Conservatives, thus, are able to
present themselves as being "progressive," whilst damning their social-democratic
opponents as "reactionary." . . . Once the state adopts its new role in
677
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A. Major Approaches to Regulation
A first major approach is generally characterized as
neoclassical or "hands-off"-I prefer to call it downstream or ex
post. It is reactive." The other major approach is to intervene to
try to dictate the future direction of the market, a more
interventionist approach-I call it upstream or ex ante . It is
often motivated by distributive concerns.4' For the same reasons,
the regulation of inchoate technologies cannot, and should not, be
approached from the perspective of whether the technology itself
or technological progress is "good" or "bad." Evaluative
judgments of this nature are unlikely to succeed if translated into
stark policy choices. Instead, one should look at inchoate
technologies as adding a dimension to the traditional policy
equation.
I hasten to add that my point is not to recreate a centuries-old
debate (which may nonetheless matter on a broader level) on the
appropriateness of ex ante interventions by the state in the affairs of
private citizens and businesses."o Rather, my suggestion is that
when the target of a possible regulatory intervention is an inchoate
technology, the policymaking equation's complexity increases
dramatically, which reduces the chances of a successful regulatory
impact (measured by whether the objective is achieved).'
Even depoliticized policymaking will still lead to such
consequences, if only because decisionmakers do not have, and in
generating techno-scientific progress by functionalizing scientific research,
there are few opportunities to introduce a different logic of economic
development ....
Ulrich Hilpert, State-Induced Participation in New World Markets: Some Comparative
Conclusions on Trends in Internationalization Through Techno-Industrial Innovation, in
STATE POLICIES AND TECHNO-INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 340 (Ulrich Hilpert ed., 2002) (1991).
46. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 380
(2007) (defining ex post and ex ante regulation).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. As a simple thought experiment, is the Internet or nuclear fusion good or bad?
When I use any technology in class to discuss this aspect of technology regulation,
students come up with "good" and "bad" columns and often disagree as to which feature
fits into which column.
50. Thomas Sowell's work illustrates this classical dilemma that policymakers face:
Politics [leading to a regulatory intervention] and the market are both ways of
getting some people to respond to other people's desires. . . . However, the two
processes are profoundly different. . .. In short, political decisions tend to be
categorical, while economic decisions tend to be incremental. Incremental
decisions can be more fine-tuned.
THOMAS SOWELL, APPLIED ECONOMICS: THINKING BEYOND STAGE ONE 3 (2004).
51. See infra Part V (holding that when unintended consequences are considered,
the effect of regulation on inchoate technologies becomes impossible to predict accurately).
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some cases, cannot have the required knowledge.5 2 put
differently, the desirability of the goal tends to generate the
normative impetus for a regulatory intervention, but it does not
make a successful intervention. That success will be measured by
whether the goal was reached." Yet, the political process,
arguably by its very nature, focuses on the desirability of the goal
of the intervention much more than on how, and to what extent,
the stated goal will be implemented.
B. Regulation Pitfalls
1. Legacy Regulation. A number of potential pitfalls must
also be considered independent of ideology and politics. The first
is the enormous impact of legacy regulation. No regulation, even
when dealing with an inchoate technology, exists in a void.5 4
There is no clean slate, in other words, and the "zero state" of
regulation is not the absence of regulation but rather the existing
regulatory framework." As Robert Pepper of the U.S. Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) put it when discussing
Internet telephony: "Every incumbent sees regulation as a shield
against new entrants; every new entrant sees regulation as a
sword to slice into the new market."" Therefore, the question
that FCC policymakers addressed was whether and to what
extent competition was a value to be protected by regulation, i.e.,
how much protection did incumbents need from new entrants.
Conversely, they had to consider whether the existing framework
was flexible enough to allow new entrants to compete with
incumbents.
Applied more broadly, the notion of legacy regulation implies
that policymakers must consider the consequences of their choices
52. Essentially, knowledge of what the future holds is not possible because of an
inchoate technology's ability to react to the regulation. See SANFORD IKEDA, DYNAMICS OF
THE MIXED ECONOMY: TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERVENTIONISM 9 (1997) (noting "the
centrality of unintended consequences in the development and implementation of public
policy, owing to a lack of relevant knowledge on the part of public choosers"); see also infra
Part III.B (explaining that new regulation will have to interact with the existing
regulatory framework).
53. See IKEDA, supra note 52, at 55-56 (asserting that although governments seek
to center their operations around a "hierarchy of objectives," the complexity of modern
government often leads to the pursuit of "contradictory or incompatible policies"); infra
Part III.B (discussing the pitfalls of government intervention).
54. See Janice A. Beecher, The Prudent Regulator: Politics, Independence, Ethics,
and the Public Interest, 29 ENERGY L.J. 577, 599 (2008) (discussing the effect of global
interaction on both regulation and policymakers).
55. Id.
56. Robert Pepper, Policy Changes Necessary to Meet Internet Development, 2001
MICH. ST. L. REv. 255, 258.
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on existing regulatory frameworks. For example, in the copyright
area existing legal regulations apply to new technologies such as
the Internet.17 The copyright regulatory matrix is also connected to
other matrices, such as telecommunications, and those interfaces
must be factored in to minimize negative consequences."
Legacy regulation is not in itself a reason to intervene or not
to refrain from doing so. It is, however, part of the extant
framework that policymakers must take into account, in part
because changes to one policy lever impact others. For example,
should nanotechnology used for medical purposes be regulated as
a pharmaceutical product (legacy FDA regulation) or treated
separately, as an inchoate technology?" The former approach of
adding may impact how those general rules will be interpreted
and applied.
57. Previous arguments that cyberspace was so different from the "physical world"
that an entirely new form of regulation was needed do not seem to be convincing courts.
Courts have now applied existing contract, tort (e.g., libel), copyright, trademark, and patent
laws to the Internet. See, e.g., Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700,
702-04 (E.D. Va. 2004) (finding trademark infringement in the use of particular "pop-up"
advertising); Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022-23, 1027
(S.D. Ohio 1997) (using traditional notions of tort law to determine if unwanted e-mails
constituted trespass to chattel); Adsit Co. v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007) (applying traditional legal principles of contract law to internet "clickwrap"
agreements); see also Jovan Kurbalija, Internet Governance and International Law, in
REFORMING INTERNET GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (WGIG) 105, 106 (William J. Drake ed., 2005) (emphasizing the
appropriateness of using existing legal mechanisms for regulating the Internet).
58. Legacy regulation may also fill the regulatory void. "Perri 6" (David Ashworth)
noted that:
By 'regulation of the internet and other internationally publicly accessible
electronic networks'. . . we actually mean the application to a new field of the
[existing] regulation of personal information, intellectual property rights,
rationing of scarce resources such as certain kinds of carrying capacity,
restrictive practices and abuse of monopoly power, freedom of expression or
censorship on such grounds as obscenity, libel, advertising, tax law, privacy,
police powers in respect of surveillance, technical standards and so on.
Perri 6, Global Digital Communications and the Prospects for Transnational Regulation,
in GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION: POWER, AUTHORITY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 145-46
(David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002) (emphasis added). I realize that this would
require its own analysis, but I will posit that if an inchoate technology was able to emerge
in the extant regulatory framework, then it had the ability to develop. Of necessity, its
development will be influenced by such framework, but the issue strikes me as mostly
theoretical, because there a no-zero state (complete unregulation) seems unrealistic.
59. Otherwise known as nanomedicine, a label, which in itself seems to suggest that
it should be regulated as a medicine. See Shanna Harris, The Regulation of
Nanomedicine: Will the Existing Regulatory Scheme of the FDA Suffice?, 16 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 4, 34, 41 (2009), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v16i2/article4.pdf (explaining that the
"FDA Office of Combination Products also created a Nanotechnology Interest Group
(NTIG), which is composed of representatives from all of the centers"). The author further
explains that, "the goal of its creation was to facilitate the regulation of nanotechnology
products," but adds that "there are likely to be sui generis problems only addressable
through the creation of entirely new laws." Id.
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2. Asymmetry of Regulation. The asymmetry of regulation,
which may be defined as either treating two comparable
situations differently or treating two noncomparable situations in
the same fashion, emerges as a relevant concern.60 Asymmetric
regulation is not always a bad thing per se. Asymmetry may be
the desired outcome of a policy orientation designed to favor one
industry over another." If a new technology has only new
entrants and starts from a blank page, the risk is minimal; but
this rarely happens. For example, Internet-based TV
retransmitters may be relatively new (where they are allowed to
operate), but they are competing against existing cable
companies that are already extensively regulated and who can
use existing regulation to preserve their market." To take
another example: is multimedia or e-book publishing so different
from traditional paper-based publishing that it requires entirely
new regulations? Or should it be brought under general
publishing?63 Are rules regulating the distribution of music on
the Internet used to protect incumbents (CD makers and
distributors) against new entrants or to ameliorate market
functioning?"
Asymmetric regulation leads to distortions by providing
protection to incumbents against the competition with new
entrants. In those cases, the question is whether the
government should intervene. Should the government decide
whether old business models (used by the incumbents) and the
technologies that support them must survive? The answer
should be self-evident.
60. Pepper, supra note 56, at 257.
61. International trade regulation is another. While several governments trumpet
the virtues of free trade, in fact, their real policy objective is to export in areas where their
companies are competitive and protect industries that are not competitive from foreign
imports. In other words, policymakers usually try to adjust the regulatory framework to
obtain the maximum degree of asymmetry favoring their national industry.
62. When Internet TV retransmitter iCraveTV (and later JumpTV) started up in
Canada, the Copyright Act (R.S.C. c C-42) was quickly amended to exclude Internet
retransmitters from the definition of retransmitters to prevent them from taking
advantage of the compulsory license for cable retransmitters. See Matt Jackson, The
Technological Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Canadian Copyright and Internet
Transmissions, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 133, 144 (discussing the Canadian Legislature's
response to the development of Internet retransmission).
63. To continue along the lines of footnote 61 above with a simple example, the
government of a country where traditional publishing flourishes and is highly
competitive, but not competitive in e-publishing, might not be willing to extend the same
benefits to the e-publishing industry.
64. See Jared S. Welsh, Pay What You Like-No, Really: Why Copyright Law
Should Make Digital Music Free for Noncommercial Uses, 58 EMoRY L.J. 1495, 1509-11
(2009) (discussing recording agreements and whether digital distribution models are
supported by legislation and existing contracts).
681
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C. Breyer's Six Reasons
A better model in my view is the one proposed by Stephen
Breyer (now a U.S. Supreme Court Justice). In a seminal article
on regulatory reform, he argued that there are six reasons to
regulate: the need to control monopoly power; the need to control
windfall profits; the need to correct for spillover costs
(externalities); the need to compensate for inadequate
information; the need to eliminate 'excessive' competition; and
the need to alleviate scarcity.5
An inchoate technology exhibiting all or most of the
characteristics described in Part II (novelty, unpredictability,
instability, and development by several small start-ups) could
hardly be the basis for a monopoly or windfall profits; and
information about the technology will, like the technology itself,
be a constantly moving target.66
In fact, I suggest that, of the six reasons mentioned by
Justice Breyer, it seems that only the elimination or prevention of
significant harm is likely to apply to an inchoate technology. His
six-reason approach is thus commensurate with the model
outlined in Part VIII. I return to this issue below.67
IV. THE TECHNOPOLICY TRIANGLE
One of the pillars of the analytical model I propose is the fact
that inchoate technologies are a moving target. The following
65. Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Deregulation in the United States: Airlines,
Telecommunications and Antitrust, in DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION? REGULATORY
REFORM IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, 7, 9-11 (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990).
Prior to his elevation to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Breyer had been an "architect" of
airline deregulation. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Financial Performance of the Airline
Industry Post-Deregulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 421, 476 (2008) (discussing Supreme Court
Justice Stephen Breyer's involvement in airline deregulation while he served as an aide to
Senator Ted Kennedy in the 1970s).
66. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
67. Breyer's approach is of course a much broader net cast over all regulation. In
the same vein, Ludwig von Mises noted in his classic text that "[als soon as something
happens in the economy that any of the various bureaucratic institutions does not like or
that arouses the anger of a pressure group, people clamor for new interventions."
LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 859 (3d ed. Henry
Regnery Co. 1966) (1949); see IKEDA, supra note 52, at 11 (suggesting that deadweight
losses and other unintended consequences tend to play only a marginal role in public
choice and that "redistributional activities produce deadweight losses and other
unintended effects [that are] often completely irrelevant from the viewpoint of the
decision-making agents in public-choice models, in which incentives are nearly always
the central focus").
To be clear, while a Misesian critique might support a model arguing for limited regulation
of inchoate technologies, I do not take the view that regulatory impulses in general should be
avoided for the reasons that von Mises, Ikeda, and others have mentioned.
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triangle may be useful to explicate how the nature of inchoate
technologies affects the policy equation:
IT
IT-Inchoate technology
M-Market
R-Regulation
M R
This triangular model is intended to reflect the complexity of
inchoate technologies compared to the traditional analytical grid
(intervention/no-intervention) axis described above." It is not a
matter of deciding whether to intervene or not. Even if a
regulatory intervention is deemed desirable, it may not achieve
its objective and may in fact be counterproductive. The added
layer of complexity stems from the fact that each element of the
triangle reacts to actions by the other two. An inchoate technology
reacts to both market changes and regulation, and the market
reacts to technological and regulatory changes. It seems logical
that regulatory changes should similarly take account of both
technology and the market, and that policymakers should expect
this dual reaction to any change." Technology, especially during
its inchoate phase(s), is a constantly moving target.
Timing is thus a crucial element because it is axiomatic that
technological change happens faster than social change.o Thus,
68. Supra Part III.
69. In fact, some organization theorists might add a fourth dimension; namely, how
organizations react to market and other forces. As noted in 1992:
[T]he preferences of designers, makers and users do not lead in any unmediated
way to particular outcomes for the position and power of current users mediates
between design and outcome and is channeled in part by the unintended
consequences of social life. What is crucial, then, is to retain the ambiguity of
technology in the sense that organizations and social relations are neither
determined by technology nor are they determined by social agency;
organizations are the contingent result of a permanently unstable network of
human and non-human actors. Technology and its properties, then, are not fixed
or determinate but contingent.
Keith Grint, Sniffers, Lurkers, Actor Networkers: Computer Mediated Communications as
a Technical Fix, in TECHNOLOGICAL LITERACY AND THE CURRICULUM 148, 154-55 (John
Beynon & Hughie Mackay eds., 1992).
For our purposes, however, this is less of an issue because as legal entities,
organizations tend to be relatively stable regulatory targets, and regulation is generally
not designed to modify the behavior of a single organization.
70. Examples abound. To take just one, in vitro fertilization techniques have evolved
faster than acceptance of a lesbian couple's decision to have a child together. See generally
John G. New, "Aren't You Lucky You Have Two Mamas?": Redefining Parenthood in Light of
Evolving Reproductive Technologies and Social Change, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 774 (2006)
(discussing how the legal field has addressed the changing concept of parentage). In his classic
book, Lewis Mumford argued that social change requires more than technological progress:
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by the time a regulation is in place, the regulated technological
target may already be outdated or have changed to defeat the
regulation, especially for a fast-developing inchoate technology."
My suggestions are that:
(a) An inchoate technology is an element that exists in
part independently from the market and regulation;
it has life of its own. For example, there will always
be some technology that will be invented not because
market forces demand it; and
(b) Mass-market inchoate technologies may counter
regulation to empower market demand, most notably
user behavior encouraged by social norms.
With this in mind, the next step in devising a productive
approach to the regulation of inchoate technologies is to identify
pitfalls to avoid.
V. THE "LAW" OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Unintended consequences are to policymaking what gravity
is to Newtonian physics: inescapable. This is perhaps why, in
both cases, we colloquially refer to the "laws" of unintended
consequences and gravity.7 In fact, probably the single most
All the critical instruments of modern technology-the clock, the printing press,
the water-mill, the magnetic compass, the loom, the lathe, gunpowder, paper, to
say nothing of mathematics and chemistry and mechanics-existed in other
cultures. The Chinese, the Arabs, the Greeks, long before the Northern
European, had taken most of the first steps toward the machine. . . . It remained
for the peoples of Western Europe to carry the physical sciences and the exact
arts to a point no other culture had reached, and to adapt the whole mode of life
to the pace and capabilities of the machine.
LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION 4 (1934).
71. Contrast the regulation of a technology where the "arms race" has mostly ended
(radar detectors), after detectors of radar detectors and detectors of detectors of radar
detectors were marketed, and the regulation of music file sharing on the Internet, where
in spite of ever tougher potential sanctions and the deployment of new antipiracy
technologies, the phenomenon is far from contained. On the former, consider:
[Tihe absence of empirical data supporting the proposition that radar detectors
decrease highway safety, numerous proposals to ban the devices have been
introduced by state legislators. Although these efforts "have not been fruitful in
the past 10 years," Virginia, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia have
succeeded in prohibiting these devices.
Nikolaus F. Schandlbauer, Busting the "Fuzzbuster": Rethinking Bans on Radar Detectors,
94 DICK. L. REV. 783, 784-85 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
72. Weber presents an approach that serves a useful purpose if only as heuristics.
See GLOBALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 287 (Steven Weber ed.,
2001) ("[Tlhe so-called 'logic' of unintended consequences is not really logic at all, but is
exactly what needs to be explained in most accounts of institutional change."). The
usefulness follows from the ability of the notion to call attention to key elements of the
equation.
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important source of the discrepancy between a stated policy
objective and the outcome-after an attempt to implement such
objective-comes under the rubric of unintended consequences.
Thomas Sowell asserts that many of the unintended
consequences of policies and programs would have been
foreseeable if "processes had been analyzed in terms of the
incentives and constraints they created, instead of in terms of the
desirability of the goals they proclaimed. Once we start thinking
in terms of the chain of events set in motion by particular
policies ... the world begins to look very different.""
As noted in the Introduction, my thesis is that the chain(s) of
events concerning the future of inchoate technologies that may be
diverted or interrupted are mostly unknown and that the optimal
course of action is to resist a regulatory impulse not based on
safety concerns, as embodied in the precautionary principle.7 4
Even though unintended consequences are well known, they
are a strangely ignored facet of policy implementation. Yet, they
emerge in almost all possible contexts: from a war in Iraq that
may have strengthened the enemy to tax policies that either
"force" companies towards shelters that may make the income
previously taxed at a lower rate completely disappear from the
tax collector radar and subsidies that incentivize behaviors at the
expense of another similarly desirable one."
It is well documented that redistributional policies tend to
produce deadweight losses, but the policymakers tend to ignore
them because policymakers focus on the behavior they have
incentivized, not behaviors that were negatively affected.76 For
example, when the U.S. government launched a Biomass Crop
Assistance Program in the 2008 Farm Bill, its laudable aim was
to convert wood shavings into renewable energy." The major
73. SOWELL, supra note 50, at 3 (emphasis added).
74. See infra Part VI (showing that when legal regulation strays too far from social
norms, technology will adapt to circumvent the regulation).
75. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (the "Modern Prometheus" as she referred to it)
comes to mind. MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Heritage Press, 1934) (1818); see PETER W.
GALBRAITH, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: How WAR IN IRAQ STRENGTHENED AMERICA'S
ENEMIES 66 (2009) (contending that the war in Iraq led to the very consequence that it was
supposed to prevent: a takeover of a large part of the country by Iranian-backed militia).
76. See IKEDA, supra note 52, at 11 (noting that deadweight losses and other
unintended consequences tend to play only a marginal role in public choice and that
"redistributional activities produce deadweight losses and other unintended effects [that
are] often completely irrelevant from the viewpoint of the decision-making agents in
public-choice models, in which incentives are nearly always the central focus").
77. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 8701 (Supp. II 2008)); Juliet Eilperin, Biomass Subsidy
Has Hidden Cost, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2010, at A3.
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impact it had was to make sawdust unavailable to makers of
low-end cabinetry, while costing U.S. taxpayers $500 million."
This example is related to a new area of technology; namely,
biofuels and other non-fossil sources of energy." It is a good
example of a technology that, for valid normative reasons, a
government considers worth supporting but without
appropriately weighing the impact on other areas and thereby
perhaps preventing or slowing down the development of
technologies that could achieve the stated aim of biofuels such as
reduction in greenhouse gases and greater energy independence.
Indeed it gets worse: new studies question whether biofuels
contribute to a reduction in greenhouse gases and suggest they
may actually increase total emissions."o Obviously, this was
unintended; it resulted from a defective analysis of the impact
on other uses of the biomass. As the authors of a report
published in Science noted:
Most prior studies have found that substituting biofuels for
gasoline will reduce greenhouse gases because biofuels
sequester carbon through the growth of the feedstock. These
analyses have failed to count the carbon emissions that occur
as farmers worldwide respond to higher prices and convert
forest and grassland to new cropland to replace the grain (or
cropland) diverted to biofuels. By using a worldwide
agricultural model to estimate emissions from land-use
change, we found that corn-based ethanol, instead of
producing a 20% savings, nearly doubles greenhouse
emissions over 30 years and increases greenhouse gases for
167 years.
Tenner mentions literally hundreds of other examples.82 To
pick just two, he notes that legislatures and insurance companies
promote the use of alarm systems." However, in a Philadelphia
study, only 3,000 of 157,000 calls from automated systems were
real." False alarms diverted the equivalent of 58 full-time police
officers from other duties and may have led to a net increase in
78. Eilperin, supra note 77.
79. See Nathan K. Shrewsbury, Patentability of Living Matter Related to Biofuel
Production in the U.S., 5 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 46, 46 (2009), available at http://www.okjolt.org
images/pdf/2009okjoltrev46.pdf (discussing the differences between biofuels and fossil fuels).
80. Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse
Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 1238, 1238-40 (2008).
81. Id. at 1238 (emphasis added).
82. See TENNER, supra note 11, at 7 (asserting that the benefits of technology are
often accompanied by unintended consequences that appear to cancel out the very reason
for using the technology).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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crime." In another set of examples on the technology-regulation
interface, Leonard Evans's work has shown that many
technologies mandated by traffic laws, such as seat belts, failed
to decrease the number of injuries, probably because drivers feel
that they can take more risks, thereby actually increasing the
risks to other road users."
Jennifer Light 7  also studied several other interesting
examples, such as the (a) regulations that forced companies to
offer telecommuting options to employees with disabilities that
eventually led to workplaces less adapted to the needs of these
employees;" (b) regulations that put calculators in the hands of
underachieving students that led to lower scores in math;" and
(c) two-second delay between a red light in one direction and the
switch to a green light in the other which was quickly internalized
by drivers who then started routinely "jumping" the red light."o
The "law" of unintended consequences, when applied to an
inchoate technology, supports the claim that because of the
high degree of unpredictability of the evolution of the
technology, the impact of future chains of events is almost
impossible to predict, and whether more harm than good will be
prevented by even well-intended regulation is educated guesswork
at best. This also means that a model such as cost-benefit
85. Id.
86. LEONARD EVANS, TRAFFIC SAFETY 295-96 (2004). His conclusion applied to the
U.K Another article presents a discussion of the U.S. situation. See Michael Sivak et. al.,
Traffic Safety in the U.S.: Re-examining Major Opportunities, 38 J. SAFETY REs. 337, 351
(2007) ("[Dlrivers who do not wear seat belts are also the drivers who are more likely to be
involved in crashes and have more severe crashes."). That study points to advantages of
imposing the use of seat belts but notes that beyond any regulatory effort, the only way to
truly reduce road fatalities is to convince drivers to drive more slowly and never while
intoxicated. See id. ("[Wie have an uphill battle to motivate all drivers to do everything
they can to improve their own safety and the safety of other traffic participants (e.g., by
wearing seat belts, not exceeding speed limits, and not driving while intoxicated)."). It
should be noted that those technologies have a comparative low level of inchoateness. My
point here is to emphasize that even regulating those technologies may create unintended
consequences.
87. Jennifer S. Light, New Technologies and Regulation: Why the Future Needs
Historians, 2001 MICH. ST. L. REV. 241.
88. Id. at 244 ("We need to put in place a set of public policies attentive to the
predictably complex and even contradictory consequences of technological innovations.").
89. Electronic Frontier Foundation's report on unintended (negative) consequences
of the DMCA is interesting. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES: TWELVE YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (Feb. 2010), https://www.eff.org/files/
eff-unintended-consequences-12-years.pdf.
90. See JAMES BONNESON & KARL ZIMMERMAN, TEXAS TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE:
DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING AND TREATING LOCATIONS WITH A
RED-LIGHT-RUNNING PROBLEM 6-2 (2004), http://tti.tamu.edudocuments/0-4196-2.pdf
(finding traffic accident rates decrease by forty percent when the delay between red and
green lights is increased from 2.5 to 3.5 seconds).
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analysis, which is used by the U.S. government, almost
amounts to fiction because both the costs and the benefits are
impossible to assess with any degree of accuracy."' The same
may be said of related notions taken as normative in this
context, such as "efficiency."92
Even if one acknowledges that occasionally unintended
consequences may be positive (however this is measured), this is
hardly a valid reason to ignore them in the hope that unintended
consequences will somehow "even out."" This would be policy
poker, not policymaking.
91. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis, see Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit
Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1153, 1160 (2000), where he argues that cost-benefit analysis is inexact because of the
difficulty in placing a value on human life. Cost-benefit analysis is routinely invoked in
congressional action in the United States and informs many Executive Branch decisions,
one of which was upheld in 2009 by the Supreme Court (Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009)). The Court found that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) acted reasonably in weighing the costs and benefits of various technologies when it
promulgated regulations under section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1326(b);
69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (2004)), which requires that power plants employ "the best technology
available for minimizing [their] adverse environmental impact." The Court concluded that
while cost-benefit analysis is not the only and may not be the best policy analysis tool, it
was "within the bounds of reasonable interpretation." Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1508. For a
comment, see The Supreme Court: 2008 Term-Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 342,
343 (2009), which argues that the Supreme Court granted the EPA deference to follow its
own interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
92. Even if one can probably safely posit that a policymaking effort should strive to be
"efficient," efficiency may be defined not as achieving the original objective but much more
loosely as whether the welfare impacts (intended or not) of a regulatory intervention were
positive. Efficiency measurements would have to include a time factor because implementation
will vary over time (that is, measuring regulatory performance is not an event; it is best viewed
as a process). Both the market and technology respond to the change in the regulatory
environment in the more complex systemic way illustrated by the TechnoPolicy triangle; the
distance between empirically verifiable outcomes and the objectives may well increase.
And then of course, one may apply Pareto optimal efficiency, according to which,
given a set of alternative allocations of, say, goods or income for a set of individuals, a
Pareto improvement is a change from one allocation to another that makes at least one
individual better off without making any other individual worse off; that is, an allocation
is Pareto optimal when no further Pareto improvements can be made without making
someone worse off. Or one could apply Kaldor-Hicks efficiency according to which Pareto
optimal outcomes can be reached by arranging some compensation from those that are
made better off to those that are made worse off. In fact, the compensation principle was
apparently developed by Pareto himself, another Italian economist Enrico Barone, and
British economist Alfred Marshall as early as 1890. See John S. Chipman, Hicksian
Welfare Economics, in THE LEGACY OF HICKS: HIS CONTRIBUTIONS To ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 96 (Harald Hagemann & O.F. Hamouda eds., 1995) (providing a "critical
examination" of Hicks' compensation principle); Dinh The Luc, Pareto Optimality, in
PARETO OPTIMALITY, GAME THEORY AND EQUILIBRIA 481-82 (Altannar Chinchuluun et.
al. eds., 2008) ("The concept of Pareto optimality originated in the economic equilibrium
and welfare theories at the beginning of the past century.").
93. To quote Tenner again, "[Miost unintended consequences are unpleasantly
rather than pleasantly surprising. We usually discover even the positive effects only after
negative experience." TENNER, supra note 11, at 6.
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VI. TECHNOLOGY AS REGULATION
Lawrence Lessig, in his seminal book Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace, made the point that (computer) code may be stronger
than legal code (regulation).9 4 In the case of software-based
technologies, the reaction to legal regulation may thus be a
different form of "code." Once computer code becomes standard, it
is (as it were) the de facto rule. Specific legal regulation is
therefore unnecessary because technology replaces regulation or
leads to the development of standards that regulation can only
confirm, but not easily change.95 There are several examples of
code (or, more generally, technology) coming to the rescue of
policymakers. I use copyright as an example watermarked
throughout this Essay, but other areas such as privacy9 6 and
taxation" could also be mentioned here.
Lessig's principal insight, in my view, was the interaction
between the two sets of rules that govern the Internet; namely,
legal and software code ("East Coast" and "West Coast" code,
respectively99 ). If the legal code is too far removed from the social
norm, then West Coast code will give Internet users the tools to
"fight" the legal norm. Music "sharing" is an excellent example.99
The development of peer-to-peer file-sharing (p2p) technology was
viewed by the recording industry as a potential lethal threat, and
94. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 4 (1999).
95. As Charles Clark, a former publishing industry lawyer once said, "The answer
to the machine is in the machine." See CHARLES CLARK, The Answer to the Machine Is in
the Machine, in "THE ANSWER TO THE MACHINE IS IN THE MACHINE" AND OTHER
COLLECTED WRITINGS 11 (Jon Bing & Thomas Dreier eds., 2005). As a specific example, it
would hardly be economically efficient, if at all possible, to mandate a change of the
protocols that "regulate" data flows on the Internet backbone. See Michael Gilden,
Jurisdiction and the Internet: The "Real World" Meets Cyberspace, 7 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 149, 151 (2000) (arguing there is no way to monitor Internet transmissions, so
countries have no way to block Internet transmissions); see also Marcus Maher, An
Analysis of Internet Standardization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 195 (1998),
http://www.vjolt.net/ vol3/issuelvol3_art5.pdf ("[Tihe Internet has become a vast network
of diverse interests competing to control its future.").
96. This includes technologies such as PGP/P3P and encryption. Platform for
Privacy Preferences (P3P) Project, http://www.w3.org/P3P/ (last visited July 7, 2010).
97. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1665
(1996) (stating the government grants tax breaks for research and development that
promotes overall commercial development).
98. See LESSIG, supra note 94, at 53 (defining "East Coast Code" as enacted by
Congress and "West Coast Code" as code embedded in hardware and software).
99. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime
for File-sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 52 (2004) ("If policy makers insist on making
illegal socially-acceptable conduct, technology will adapt to the legal environment
either by circumventing the legal norm or by making enforcement either impossible or
too costly.").
689
HeinOnline  -- 47 Hous. L. Rev. 689 2010-2011
690 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [47:3
it used a complete legal arsenal to try to stop it dead in its tracks.'o
This was fairly successful in the case of Napster, a file-sharing
service with a centralized directory.0 ' Attempts to shut down
decentralized p2p services, e.g., using software such as Freenet,
KaZaa and Scour, have been somewhat less successful, and new
services have emerged (BitTorrent, LimeWire, and many others
since).'02 On the other side of the technological battlefield, a
number of companies are offering technologies to wrap copyright
material in digital containers that prevent unauthorized use or
spiders and content detectives that track unauthorized content
on the Internet.'0 ' Another example would be the technological
handshake used by Internet music-streaming services'04 or the
country-coding of DVDs.'o' The United States has had legislation
to reinforce technological protection measures (TPMs) since 1998:
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).'06 Yet, countries
where no such legislation exists (e.g., Canada) have only
marginally higher rates of p2p."
The TechnoPolicy analysis presented in Part IV shows that
the industry's efforts are bound to fail. If music "sharing" is
supported by social norms (given that it is used by a majority of
100. The threat is so severe that the industry apparently needs not just to prevent
technological circumvention but any fair use of music. See William Henslee, You Can't
Always Get What You Want, But If You Try Sometimes You Can Steal It and Call It Fair
Use: A Proposal to Abolish the Fair Use Defense for Music, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 663, 665
(2009) (arguing courts have interpreted the fair use doctrine so broadly it may render an
author's rights meaningless).
101. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding Napster could be shutdown because its software failed to prevent infringement of
copyrighted materials).
102. See Welsh, supra note 64, at 1518-19 (reviewing recent technological changes
and the recording industry's response).
103. See id. at 1520 (explaining the system of digital rights management, or "DRM").
104. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2000) (explaining the "secret handshake" employed by RealAudio to
control access to copyright works); see also RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No.
2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (same).
105. See Robert Silva, DVD Region Codes-What You Need to Know,
http//hometheater.about.com/csdvdlaserdis/a/aaregioncodesa.htm (last visited July 6, 2010)
(arguing DVDs have region codes to prevent pirating and to protect movie studio profits).
106. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545 (6th Cir. 2004).
107. This is accurate as of 2003, at least. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), WORKING PARTY ON THE INFORMATION
ECONOMY-DIGITAL BROADBAND CONTENT: MUSIC 75 (2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
13/2/34995041.pdf (arguing the proportion of Canada's population that shares files is
"closely followed by the United States"). Due to its failure to enact anticircumvention
legislation, Canada is a prime U.S.T.R. target. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 17 (2009), http-//www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-
publications/2009/2009-special-301-report.
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Internet users, at least those in the younger age brackets which
constitute the bulk of music buyers), then legal efforts to block p2p
are out of step with user demand.o' According to the TechnoPolicy
triangle, technology will respond either by circumventing the legal
norm or making its enforcement next to impossible.
Empirical data supports this proposition. When Napster was
shut down, the demand and the underlying "sharing"-based social
norm were simply too strong, and p2p was born in the form of
LimeWire and other "clients," i.e., computer programs that, once
downloaded on a user's PC, allow her to share some of her
computer's contents (files) with other users of the same (or
compatible) software.o' Because p2p software is meant to empower
sharing-some of which is perfectly legal because it does not involve
copyrighted material-the software makers have, up to now, been
essentially immune."o As to users of the software, first the music
industry had to find who they were and thus, had to use subpoenas
(issued under the DMCA) to force Internet service providers (ISP) to
disclose the identity of their subscribers. One ISP was successful in
challenging such subpoenas." More importantly, technology has
"responded" by making anonymous file sharing possible, using
anonymizing clients and repurposing the "old" USENET.112
108. See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION 72
(2002) (explaining how legal efforts to stop Napster were successful but ultimately failed
to stop file sharing in general).
109. See Seagrumn Smith, From Napster to Kazaa: The Battle over Peer-to-Peer
Filesharing Goes International, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., no. 0008, at 1,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/d1tr/articles/pdfl2003DLTR0008.pdf (stating international
p2p sharing sites are flourishing after the shutdown of Napster).
110. Grokster and Aimster were found liable, but on a theory of inducement, not
simply as makers of a p2 p technology. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (remanding to determine if statements made by Groskter
had the "patently illegal objective" of inducing infringement).
111. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Serv., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding an Internet service provider must be adequately
notified before it can be subpoenaed).
112. Stacey L. Dogan explains this evolution:
[Gliven the collective creativity and tenacity of those with an interest in such
technologies, the legal arms of the content industries will arguably never keep
pace with their development. Just as Grokster and Kazaa cropped up in the
immediate wake of Napster, so will existing sharing and distribution tools give
way to new generations of technologies that copyright holders will likely stand
powerless to avert.
Stacey L. Dogan, Code Versus the Common Law, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 73, 76
(2003) (footnotes omitted). See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms,
and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 508
(2003) (explaining why users of file-sharing sites are willing to make copyrighted
materials available for perfect strangers to use without any obvious incentive for doing
so); see also Bobbie Johnson, Internet Pirates Find 'Bulletproof Havens for Illegal File
Sharing, GUARDIAN, Jan. 5,2010, http/A/www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010fjani/05/internet-
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Is music file sharing truly supported by relevant social
norm or is it just "theft"?"' Howard Rheingold argues that
sharing was/is more than just a socially acceptable behavior; it
is part of a broad and developing form of social interaction
which he termed "adhocracies" or, more eloquently perhaps,
"smart mobs." 4 Internet users can use the Internet to share the
various facets of their lives with other people with similar
tastes, political views, etc. Social networking sites such as
Facebook or MySpace facilitate and, in fact, may reinforce these
phenomena. These can lead to informal, yet powerful, networks
of influence and new forms of lobbying."' While these
developments are arguably still inchoate and in their early
stages in terms of replacing or complementing existing
channels, the same cannot be said of music sharing, which has
become the main form of access to music for a great number of
Internet users. 1
In short, legal efforts to stem the tide of file sharing will not
work because that "sharing" is empowered by social norms, and
technology is able to adapt and morph to defeat regulation."'
Some download transactions are paid for; others are
experimental or social in nature."8 This is evolving of course, and
the industry may legitimately try to move more users to pay
more often. The best way to do this is (a) to make it easy and
piracy-bulletproof (describing the experience of a particular Internet pirate). Johnson
details:
'Before going completely dark in October 2009, Demonoid physically moved their
servers to Ukraine, and remotely controlled them,' said John Robinson, of
BigChampagne, a media tracking service based in Los Angeles. 'Ukrainian
communications law, as they paraphrase it, says that providers are not
responsible for what their customers do. Therefore, they feel no need to speak
about or defend what they do.'
Id.
113. See Henslee, supra note 100, at 668 (arguing copyright laws need to be updated
to protect music copyright owners from unauthorized use or misuse of their intellectual
property).
114. RHEINGOLD, supra note 108, at 169 (defining a smart mob as a "[miobile ad hoc
social network").
115. See ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY 177 (2000)
(explaining how lobbyists use recent technological advances, like computerized mass
mailings, to target narrow interest groups).
116. See Victoria Shannon, Record Labels Contemplate Unrestricted Digital Music,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 2007, at C5 (stating the MP3 format of music has "destroyed" the
record industry's control over the world distribution of music).
117. See Dogan, supra note 112, at 76 (arguing record industries will "never keep
pace" with those attempting to download pirated music).
118. See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 6
(2004) (saying the internet's value as a source of information continues to grow
exponentially, while its value as a source of commerce ebbs and flows).
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(b) to develop initiatives that will allow users progressively to
internalize the need to "do the right thing.""'
This brief tour of p2p regulation illustrates the difficulty of
regulating a technology that can change to respond to demand
and social norms, especially when, as with software, the
technology is highly nimble.
VII.THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
Whether a technology ultimately generates more positive or
negative outcomes depends on its use.120 From that perspective,
few, if any, technologies are risk free, and hence regulation is
perhaps best viewed here as risk management.121 1 suggest that,
to proceed coherently, policymakers need an appropriate
framework to decide on bans and limits on the use of an inchoate
technology. In my view, this framework should be based on the
precautionary principle, both because of its convincing normative
underpinnings, which, as I argue below, are consistent with the
model I am proposing, and because it fits squarely within
accepted principles of international law. 2 2
I should state at the outset that one must distinguish the
analytical framework of the precautionary principle, which I
suggest should apply to determine whether to attempt to
regulate an inchoate technology, from the simple exercise of
caution by a government.' At its core, the application of the
precautionary principle justifies taking action in the absence of
119. Arguably at least, paid sites should be as "good" as free ones, although the exact
value proposition of each service may be rated differently by each user. The suggestion
here is to use social norms, not fight them. See Jensen, supra note 8, at 535 (arguing the
guilt that comes from violating social norms is so strong it can completely replace the
threat of conventional punishment).
Experience supports the claim that not all free activity is nefarious in nature. Some
of it may allow Internet users to share discoveries of new artists with friends, a form of
viral marketing. If users paid for the songs "they know they want," the industry would
have scored a major victory and could then leverage the Internet instead of trying to shut
it down.
120. As Arthur Koestler noted, "Like any other human science, biochemistry can
serve the powers of light or of darkness. Its dangers are terrifying; but we are now
concerned with its beneficial possibilities." ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE GHOST IN THE
IVIACHINE 334 (Danube ed. 1976). Should biochemistry be banned because a terrorist
might build a biological device using the knowledge developed by those researchers?
121. See DAN GARDNER, RISK: THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF FEAR 282 (2008) (citing
situations where terrorists could abuse technology for nefarious purposes).
122. See infra note 131 and accompanying text (referencing three situations where
courts nearly embraced the precautionary principle).
123. Arie Trouwborst, The Precautionary Principle in General International Law:
Combating Babylonian Confusion, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 185, 189
(2007).
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complete scientific information (and, a fortiori, agreement) of a
causal relationship between an activity and a threat of harm to
human health or the environment.2 4 Going back to examples
used previously, the first commercial airplanes were risky by
contemporary standards, sometimes for technological reasons
(several crashed before people realized that they had to be de-iced),
but everyone knew the nature of risk; namely that everyone in
the plane would die, but essentially nothing else would happen.'2 5
Genetically engineered food, nanotechnology, or cold fusion, on the
other hand, creates potential risks that we cannot fully envision.
A. History
The precautionary principle arose due to a heightened
awareness of the environment's vulnerability to human interference
and of science's ineffectiveness to predict the effects of such
interference.126 In part, the precautionary principle also has its
origins in technological skepticism.m The first legislative
implementation seems to have been the Swedish Environmental
Protection Act of 1969.128 Internationally, the first expression of the
124. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 4
(2005) ("[R]egulators should take steps to protect against potential harms, even if causal
chains are unclear and even if we do not know that those harms will come to fruition.");
James Cameron et al., Precautionary Principle and Future Generations, in FUTURE
GENERATIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW 93, 98 (Emmanuel Agius & Salvino Busuttil eds.,
1998) (arguing scientific data for the precautionary principle is elusive and hard to find).
While it is often invoked in environmental matters, it is also routinely used more broadly
in toxicological controls and workplace safety (which may of course have environmental
impacts). See A. Wallace Hayes, The Precautionary Principle, 56 ARCHIVES INDUS.
HYGIENE & TOXICOLOGY 161, 162 (2005) (discussing how the precautionary principle has
been used to regulate benzene levels in the workplace).
125. Interestingly, the environmental risks of using massive amounts of deicing fluid
have raised concerns. See Matthew J. Griesemer, Welcome Aboard: Aircraft Deicing Fluid
and the Environmental Epidemic It Is Causing, 72 J. AIR L. & Comm. 727, 744 (2007)
("The time has come for the FAA to take more responsibility and regulate exactly which
types of deicing systems are acceptable and which are not.").
126. See ARIE TROUWBORST, PRECAUTIONARY RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES 117 (2006)
(stating that the precautionary principle was designed to answer the problem of science's
limited capacity to predict environmental effects coupled with a vulnerable environment).
127. INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT 6 (2001); see also David Kriebel et al., The
Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 871, 871-73
(2001) (discussing how the precautionary principle allows for taking action in the face of
uncertainty and stimulates the search for safer technologies); supra p. 669 and note 12
(observing the ability of technology to evolve in unpredictable ways).
128. See Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 HUM.
& ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: AN INT'L J. 445, 448 (2000) (observing that the
precautionary principle was first translated into law in Scandinavia with the passing of
the Swedish Environment Protection Act). However, it is generally recognized that the
principle developed from German environmental policy founded on the Vorsorgeprinzip.
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 16 (noting that although the first use of a precautionary
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precautionary principle appeared in the 1982 United Nations World
Charter for Nature, which stated that when "potential adverse
effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed."'29
The principle was multilateralized in two specific sectors;
namely, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) and the Wassenaar Arrangement."'0 Despite those
adoptions into various treaties, however, it is still unsettled
whether the principle has crystallized into a principle of
customary international law. This uncertainty may be because
formulations of the precautionary principle in international law
lack uniformity.'"' In the context of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) dispute-settlement system, where the compatibility of a
measure based on the precautionary principle with any of the
WTO Agreements may be challenged, a measure should normally
reflect the majority view of the scientific community, although
some leeway was granted to base the measure on the minority
view in certain cases.
principle in law was the Swedish Environmental Protection Act of 1969, at the same time
the Vorsorgeprinzip, a precursor of the precautionary principle, was forming the basis of
German environmental policy).
129. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, Annex, I 11(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7
(Oct. 28, 1982), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm. See also
GOKLANY, supra note 127, at 4 (revealing that although versions of the precautionary
principle started to appear in various declarations and agreements in the 1980s, its
"international debut" was in the 1982 United Nations World Charter).
130. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 169; see N. Jansen Calamita, Sanctions, Countermeasures, and the
Iranian Nuclear Issue, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1393, 1418-33 (2009) (discussing the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the availability of unilateral countermeasures for
violations of the NPT); Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (2010), http://www.wassenaar.org/
publicdocuments/index_..BD.html (last visited July 27, 2010). For a discussion, see
generally Jamil Jaffer, Strengthening The Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 519, 521-25 (2002), which reviews the Wassenaar Agreement and suggests that
attempts to strengthen the regime must protect national sovereignty in export decisions
while still addressing the concerns of nations who choose to deny certain exports.
131. See David VanderZwaag, The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Law and
Policy: Elusive Rhetoric and First Embraces, 8 J. ENvTL. L. & PRAC. 355, 368 (1998) ("Three
recent cases before the International Court of Justice demonstrate the potential of the
precautionary principle to affect international dispute resolution, although the cases
involved 'friendly waves' at the principle, rather than wholehearted embraces of it."); see also
Trouwborst, supra note 123, at 187 (recognizing the precautionary principle is contained in
over sixty multilateral treaties, covering everything from fisheries to climate change, and
also in a wide variety of intergovernmental declarations, resolutions, and the like).
132. See Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), 16, WT/DS26/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report]
(suggesting that the precautionary principle is already a general principle of European
law applying both to the management of risk as well as to the assessment of these risks).
In this case, a ban on beef containing hormones was successfully challenged by the United
States. Id. 11 1-2, 253. The Appellate Body noted that a version of the precautionary
principle was part of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
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B. Application
In determining a proper justification for regulatory
interventions on inchoate technologies, the precautionary
principle should be front and center because it is invoked
precisely in that context: often to ban or severely restrict the use
of such a technology.'
It is worth noting at the outset that negating the possibility
of developing an inchoate technology is an extreme step and not
the only possible outcome.'34 A decision to ban may result from
ethical concerns, but it may lead to rogue research or simply a
displacement to other jurisdictions-possibly resulting in a
competitive loss measured in trade terms. 5
Turning to the principle itself, the starting point is the
recognition that inchoate technologies are unpredictable.'
Consequently, it is often impossible to predict accurately whether
such a technology (or the evolution of an existing one) will lead to
net positive or negative consequences. This begs two questions:
one normative and the other more operational in nature. The
normative question is whether governments should try to
evaluate the potential of an inchoate technology ex ante and ban
or limit the use of technological developments they view as
"mostly negative." Or should a utilitarian matrix be used and
potential welfare impacts assessed? Or perhaps ethical concerns
should trump trade or economic concerns? There is a (related)
operational question: How can governments predict the evolution
and impact of the technology independently of the analytical
mask they will then superimpose on their guesswork? What
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which requires that the measure be based on
"available scientific evidence." Id. 121-124; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures arts. 5.2 & 5.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493. Specifically,
the Appellate Body noted that Article 5.7 [of the SPS Agreement] does not exhaust the
relevance of the precautionary principle and that a panel should "bear in mind that
responsible, representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and
precaution where risks of irreversible .. . damage .. . [is] concerned." Appellate Body
Report 124.
133. "Trying to" because it may not be possible to enforce a complete ban on
'clandestine" operations. And, that ban would normally apply only within the territory of
the legislature adopting it.
134. Other, more common outcomes are restrictions on use and transparency (reporting).
135. One example is the now lifted U.S. ban on stem cell research. See Ching Pin Ang
et al., Recent Developments in Health Law, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHicS 149, 157-58 (2009)
(discussing how lifting the ban was seen as a necessary step in Michigan's bid to advance
its life sciences industry).
136. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (summarizing various previous uses of
the term "inchoate" and offering up a definition that inchoate technologies are far from
completely developed).
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dataset or working hypothesis will inform a ban? Because
technological developments are best viewed as parts of chains of
events, a ban might trigger circumventing developments with
possibly worse impacts.17  A ban might also prevent the
development of highly positive technologies that may have
emerged down an interrupted chain of events.
The precautionary principle consists of three elements: (1) a
threat of harm; (2) uncertainty; and (3) action."' It is self-evident
that the hardest part of this equation to solve, both theoretically
and empirically, is the definition of the required degree of certainty.
However, the components of this equation are also interrelated. The
resulting action, which typically will be in the form of control
imposed by regulation (up to a complete ban), should be
proportional both to the harm and to the level of uncertainty.'
Traditional application of the principle requires a threshold of
(un)certainty to trigger the application of the principle.140
Precautionary-principle theorists posit that states of risk
knowledge can be categorized in one of three ways: ignorance, as
understood to mean uncertainty that is too great to reasonably
trigger the precautionary principle; uncertainty; and certainty.14 '
The precautionary principle applies only during periods of
uncertainty. There is no basis or reasonable grounds to justify its
use during periods of ignorance. In cases in which no substantial
137. As the wars on music file sharing have evolved, they have prompted users to "go
underground" with ever more sophisticated anonymizing technologies that, if one were to
make an extreme case, terrorists might find useful. See supra notes 99, 112 (identifying
music sharing as an example where legal codes are far removed from the social norm,
thus giving individuals a reason to fight the law).
138. See Hayes, supra note 124, at 162 (simplifying the principle into a simple
equation that says a call for precautionary action arises when there is scientific
uncertainty plus suspected harm); Trouwborst, supra note 123, at 187 (breaking down the
precautionary principle into three elementary components that are present in any
currently existing definition of the principle).
139. See ALEXANDRE KIss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
212 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that precaution requires preparation for potential, uncertain
threats even if it is uncertain that the threat will occur); SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 24
(concluding that there is a presumption in favor of regulation when there is a certain
threshold risk to health, safety, or the environment); Paolo F. Ricci et al., Precaution,
Uncertainty and Causation in Environmental Decisions, 29 ENV'T INT'L 1, 5 (2003)
(indicating that the absence of information forces precautionary decisions under
uncertainty principles and not risk principles).
140. See Ricci, supra note 139, at 5 (suggesting that when this threshold of scientific
knowledge is crossed, a public institution should provide protection despite remaining
uncertainty).
141. See Shawn Kolitch, Comment, The Environmental and Public Health Impacts of
U.S. Patent Law: Making the Case for Incorporating a Precautionary Principle, 36 ENVTL.
L. 221, 224 (2006) (noting that the state of scientific knowledge regarding the impact of an
invention generally begins with ignorance, progresses to uncertainty, and ends with
certainty).
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uncertainty exists-which would be rare given the unpredictable
nature of technological evolution-the indeterminacy of
technological impacts or future developments can probably be
factored out of the equation.142
Once the precautionary principle is held to apply, its
implementation may take many forms. Some commentators have
referred to the EU Guidelines for Application of the
Precautionary Principle as indicative of proper precautionary
measures: they must be (1) proportional; (2) nondiscriminatory,
such that similar situations are treated in the same manner;
(3) consistent, such that they are similar to those already taken
in equivalent areas; (4) comprise an examination of benefits or
costs for action or lack of action, including a cost-benefit analysis
when appropriate and feasible; and (5) comprise an examination
of scientific developments, making it provisional and requiring
continued scientific research.'4 3
C. Discussion
The precautionary principle is not a perfect analytical
framework for a number of reasons. First, precautionary actions
themselves create risks that must also be assessed, contrary to
current precautionary principle implementations.14  Second, the
precautionary principle may be paralyzing and incoherent: in its
strongest forms, the precautionary principle "forbids action,
inaction, and everything in between" due to the "risks on all sides
of social situations."145 Third, precautionary decisions sometimes
hide trade protectionist measures . Yet, the precautionary
142. See Indur M. Goklany, From Precautionary Principle to Risk-Risk Analysis,
20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1075, 1075 (2002) (suggesting that the objective of the
precautionary principle is to ensure the outcome is "risk-neutral" and that this objective is
easy to meet in certain situations). If a policy only reduces risks it should clearly be
adopted, but if a policy only increases risks it should clearly be avoided. Id.
143. See Communication from the Commission of 2 February 2000 on the Precautionary
Principle, http:/europa.eu/legislation~sunmaries/consumers/consumer-safety/132042_en.htm
(last updated Feb. 11, 2005) (listing five principles of good risk management that should be
applied even in the presence of the precautionary principle); Hayes, supra note 124, at 164
(referring to the European Commission's communication discussed above).
144. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 14 (observing that the precautionary principle
has its own risks that threaten to lead to inaction); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry than
Safe: Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety
Protocol, 35 TEx. INT'L L.J. 173, 195 (2000) ("The unfortunate reality is that efforts to
regulate one risk can create other, often more dangerous risks.").
145. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 124, at 4 (indicating that the precautionary principle
may condone what it preaches); Adler, supra note 144, at 195 (suggesting that attempts to
regulate inchoate technologies can themselves create risks).
146. See Adler, supra note 144, at 203-04 (discussing the European Community's
1989 ban forbidding the importation of U.S. beef produced with growth hormones as an
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principle, correctly applied, is the most (and perhaps the only)
coherent extant framework to justify a regulatory intervention
concerning an inchoate technology.'47
The precautionary principle is a sound basis to regulate (or
not) an inchoate technology. Its focus is on safety, not on market
organization. Because of its limited focus, it is also less likely to
interrupt positive chains of events. Because the precautionary
principle's undergirding rests on risk, often to human safety, it
should also mesh with social norms-unlike regulation of an
inchoate technology unsupported by such norms or even in direct
conflict with them.4 8
VIII. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Principles
The preceding analysis allows us to outline a few principles
that may guide the regulatory hand trying to grasp an inchoate
technology. While the principles are relatively simple, their
application is not necessarily obvious.
First, changes to the techno-regulation framework must be
situated within the existing regulatory continuum; notably,
legacy regulation.4 9 Past is, if not prologue, at least a foundation
for future action, and a good historical perspective is therefore
essential to adequately modify the present regulatory framework.
This is needed to understand, as fully as possible, the depth and
scope of any policy changes under consideration.
Second, a sound factual basis to justify a regulatory
intervention is essential. Eschatological and ideological
arguments must be avoided as a basis to justify any regulatory
example of trade protectionist measures being disguised as environmental protection);
Kenneth R. Foster et al., Science and the Precautionary Principle, 288 ScI. 979, 979
(2000) (presenting the ban on imported beef as a possible example of trade
protectionism).
147. Ideology and other possible basis were discussed above. See supra Part III
(presenting various basis for the precautionary principle and concluding with six reasons
to regulate). My research has not pointed in any other convincing direction to find such a
framework.
148. See Jennifer Kuzma et al., Evaluating Oversight Systems for Emerging
Technologies: A Case Study of Genetically Engineered Organisms, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
546, 576 (2009) (noting that when it comes to environmental health and safety,
'unknowns and uncertainty are not well understood" and "[olversight favors most
conservative social norm"); see also supra notes 8, 112 and accompanying text (pointing
out that it is a struggle to enforce legal norms when society's disapproval is absent,
illustrated by attempts to curb music file sharing).
149. See supra Part IV (explaining the TechnoPolicy Triangle and the complexity of
regulating inchoate technologies).
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change in this area.' Industries that claim they will suffer
immensely absent a change to the regulation should support
their view with credible factual data, not pure speculation.' In
the same vein, one should also avoid the risk of capture or
structural conflict because of the inconsistencies in regulatory
mandates.152 Moreover, because few entirely new regulatory
wheels are invented, whenever possible, comparative law
techniques may be used if another country has in fact put in
place a measure similar to the one under consideration. 3
150. For example, in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co., 499 U.S. 340, 357-60 (1991), which
confirmed the rejection of the mere "sweat of the brow" test and required (on the basis of a
constitutional argument) that originality in the form of minimal creativity be present to
protect an actual compilation under copyright, a number of scholars and industry
observers thought that the sky had fallen for database makers. See S. Leigh Fulwood,
Feist v. Rural: Did the Supreme Court Give License to Reap Where One Has Not Sown?
9 COMM. LAW. 15, 19 (1991) ("[Vast amounts of information have been ejected into the
public domain, with resulting implications to all businesses for which the amassing or
distribution of information is essential."); see also Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of
Databases, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1109, 1133-42 (2007) (recounting the Feist v. Rural
decision to require creativity for copyright protection and the impact of the "Feist test" on
factual compilations); Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 607, 607-09
(1992) (suggesting that the implications of Feist's holding are indirect and sui generis
protection may restore what the Feist decision took away). A number of bills were
introduced in the 106th Congress containing such sui generis rights, including the
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1402 (1st Sess. 1999),
and the Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1999). No bill passed, and yet the database industry seems to have survived.
151. George J. Annas elaborates:
[Although scientists seldom like to predict the future without overwhelming data
to support them, many believe that human cloning or inheritable genetic
alternations at the embryo level will never be safe because they will always be
inherently unpredictable in their effects on the children and their offspring. As
Stewart Newman has noted, for example, it is unlikely that a human created
from the union of "two damaged cells" (an enucleated egg and a nucleus removed
from a somatic cell) could ever be healthy. Of course, adding genetic modification
to the somatic cell's nucleus just adds another series of events that could go
wrong, because genes seldom have a single function, but will usually interact in
complex and unpredictable ways with other genes.
George J. Annas et al., Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International
Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 157-58
(2002) (footnotes omitted).
152. Kuzma explains the importance of consulting independent experts early in
product development cycles:
It was also recommended that independent experts (free of COI), especially in
environmental science, be consulted early in product development and before
oversight decisions are made. Many experts agreed that oversight should be informed
by those who are not conflicted. For example, for GEOs, USDA has a dual mandate to
both promote U.S. agriculture and protect plant and environmental health.
Kuzma et al., supra note 148, at 575.
153. See David S. Clark, Nothing New in 2000? Comparative Law in 1900 and Today,
75 TUL. L. REV. 871, 881 (2001) (suggesting that one can discover general principles by
studying different countries' laws).
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Third, on the interventionism "scale," a high degree of
caution is required when dealing with an inchoate technology,
and this degree increases in proportion to the level of
inchoateness-which, in turn, increases unpredictability and the
ability of the technology and its users to circumvent the
regulatory objective.'5 4 This would militate in favor of avoiding
deep regulation of an inchoate technology and letting courts
adapt the extant regulatory framework to the new technology
because: (a) a court ruling has a smaller regulatory footprint due
to its application only to the parties to the case-subject to an
expansion due to the stare decisis rule; (b) a court ruling is
subject to review possibly twice (typically by a court of appeal
and the Supreme Court) and may be changed to reflect the
impact of new technological developments; and (c) this approach
is thus an incremental and generally more situated,
intertemporal response than a statute applying indiscriminately
to a very wide array of factual patterns.'
Fourth, to know the impact of a proposed regulatory change,
one should try to determine unintended consequences on future
chains of events. To a large degree, this is impossible to do with
any precision for inchoate technologies both because by their very
nature they are unpredictable and because they can react to
defeat regulatory efforts."6 It does seem, however, that one
possible way to consider the consequences of a regulatory
intervention is to ask what would happen if all actors did as
prompted by the regulation; that is, consider the global impact."'
154. See supra Part IV (reviewing the complexity of inchoate technologies and the
quick reaction of such technologies to both market and regulation).
155. See supra note 31 (referring to Professor Abramovicz's arguments for simplified
regulation to reduce the danger that regulations will become obsolete); infra note 162
(suggesting that litigation against the government regularly induces judicial policymaking
and gives meaning to public values); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why
National Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 476 (2000) (arguing
that national courts should not be tied by strict private international law rules).
Dinwoodie further suggests that national courts should be allowed to apply rules that
reflect the "values of all interested systems (national and international) that may have a
prescriptive claim on the outcome. This approach to choice of law may unleash the
generative power of common law adjudication. .. ." Id. In a somewhat similar vein,
Shyamkrishna Balganesh has argued that, contrary to the common law, copyright's grant
of exclusivity extends to all markets and uses for a work whether or not they were capable
of forming any part of a creator's incentive, and independently of whether the incentive
may foreseeably function as an incentive. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability
and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1614-25 (2009).
156. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (referring to various previous uses of
the term "inchoate" and suggesting that inchoate technologies are far from completely
developed).
157. An example was the introduction of an income tax deduction of mortgage in the
United States. Initially designed to promote the acquisition of homes, the tax savings
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Fifth, a regulatory intervention concerning an inchoate
technology is more likely to miss its target and to create
unintended consequences that outweigh the benefits. Absent a
sound application of the precautionary principle, in the case of
inchoate technologies, regulation is more akin to gambling than
traditional policymaking." Not only do the markets move much
faster than in traditional fields, but this moving target
phenomenon is amplified by the fact that an inchoate technology
may provide a better solution than regulation-perhaps
industry-based standards will emerge making legal regulation
unnecessary at best and potentially counterproductive.15 9 The
speed of technological development also means that once it enters
into force, regulation may, in fact, be outdated.
A final note: One must distinguish technological regulation
from the regulation of actors on other grounds. For example, if a
monopoly should develop in the market, this may warrant a
regulatory intervention, but the target is the monopoly and the
normative underpinning lies in antitrust principles.'
B. A Regulatory Approach for Inchoate Technologies
In trying to recap the analysis in the previous pages, the
structure of an intervention model for inchoate technologies
emerges. The principles to be applied are as follows:
(a) Regulatory interventions targeting inchoate
technologies are more likely to miss their target than
were fairly quickly computed into the price and house prices increased significantly,
thereby offsetting any advantage the tax measure could have for prospective buyers. The
law of unintended consequences is one governments may find hard to repeal. See supra
text accompanying notes 87-90 (pointing out Jennifer Light's research on the unintended
consequences of inchoate technology regulation).
158. A ban justified by the principle might be effective within certain territories.
Beyond that, the risk of regulatory failure is considerable. See Part VI (discussing the use
of technology as regulation and the difficulties of regulating an inchoate technology).
159. The Internet protocols (http, etc.) are industry-defined, with minor
governmental intervention. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and
Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 543 (2003) (discussing how the
government removed restrictions on the Internet in the 1990s and left it to the private
sector to chart future growth).
160. Kevin Werbach explains this distinction:
The goal of public policy in platform industries is to create optimum incentives
for both the platform owner and its users. Too many restrictions on the
platform would result in insufficient investment in creating an environment
that would produce significant value. On the other hand, an unregulated
platform monopolist may over-extract rents from the platform ecosystem.
See Kevin Werbach, Higher Standards: Regulation in the Network Age, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 179, 185 (2009). This seems commensurate with the regulatory goal not to
interrupt technological and innovation "chains of events."
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other types of regulation. That risk increases with the
degree of inchoateness of the technology and with the
scope (breadth) of the regulation. 6 ' This conclusion
also applies to later phases of rapid growth or change
to the technology. Conversely, a stable technology
subject to smaller incremental change is a better
potential target. This means that smaller-scale policy
determinations by agencies and courts are perhaps
more situated and thus, less likely to fail; but they also
may have a smaller scope, and consequently, a lesser
impact. They are also more nimble and malleable;162
(b) Technology, especially in its early stages of
deployment, reacts to the market (user demand) and
regulation but has a "life of its own" (unforeseen
"eureka" inventions, inventions generated by
inventors not seeking market dominance, user-driven
demand informed by social norms, etc.). It can morph
to circumvent regulation too far askew from users'
desires and the potential of the technology. Regulation
may induce unintended changes in the technology
that create problems equal to or worse than those
identified in the original regulatory objective;
(c) Any regulatory intervention should be preceded by a
thorough analysis of possible unintended consequences,
including in different (though usually related) fields;
161. As such, a form of regulation which may be less risky is to empower a regulatory
agency to make smaller scale (even "case-by-case") determinations with a reduced
regulatory footprint (hence the size of the risk is smaller and there is arguably a greater
chance that the factual determination will result from a better understanding and acuity
because of its more focused beam). See Edward L. Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and
the Boundaries of New Public Governance, 2010 Wisc. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1549823 (exploring the
boundaries of the New Public Governance approach to regulation at both the macro and
micro level and discussing its application to the commercial aviation industry).
162. Consider Rubin and Feeley's explanation of policy making within the judiciary:
[Plolicy making inheres in the basic structure of a modem judiciary. For the
foreseeable future, therefore, any discussion of litigation against the government
must incorporate the fact that such litigation will regularly induce the judiciary
to make public policy. Perhaps the strongest defense of this position is Owen
Fiss' claim that as "coordinate branches" of government the federal courts have
not only a right, but an obligation to make policy. He argues that the
Constitution "creates the agencies of government, describes their functions, and
determines their relationships," but that in addition it "also identifies the values
that will inform and limit this governmental structure." "Adjudication," he
maintains, "is the social process by which judges give meaning to our public
values."
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litigation Against
the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 617, 618 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
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(d) Regulatory interventions that are technology specific
and target an inchoate technology are suspect owing
to a plethora of unintended consequences on the
regulated technology itself (e.g., the regulation may
force evolution down a suboptimal path) and also
other technologies; and
(e) A regulatory intervention specific to an inchoate
technology should be warranted by a sound
application of the precautionary principle.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I argued that certain technologies I call
inchoate should be regulated differently. I am not making a
normative claim about the freedom of technology. My thesis is
that inchoate technologies are inherently unpredictable and thus
are moving targets for regulators that sometimes react to defeat
the very purpose of the regulation that targets them-especially
when the use of technology that the regulator wants to prevent is
supported by social norms. I do not exclude the possibility that
other factors might apply, but I hope to have demonstrated that
the inchoateness of a technology is a key determinant of the
likelihood of success of a regulatory intervention (measuring
success in this context as the degree to which the underlying
policy objective was achieved).' Put differently, one of my aims
was to demonstrate that inchoate technologies introduce a
dimension into a regulatory equation that applies independently
of the desired policy objective. If one accepts this proposition,
even arguendo, then a model that reflects this difference is
required, and this was the other aim of the Essay. While I do not
purport to offer a complete model, I offer analytical conclusions
and principles derived from such conclusions that a workable
model should stand on.
Because the law of unintended consequences applies
forcefully here and means that regulating an inchoate technology
may break future, potentially positive chains of technological
development, I suggested that the best, and possibly the only,
applicable analytical framework to regulate inchoate technologies
is the precautionary principle. My purpose is to generate a
scholarly response to the proposed model with a view to
developing the model further and to identifying its flaws and
deficiencies. I cannot apply the model structure proposed in this
163. That said, I readily acknowledge that the factors used to define inchoateness
and its various degrees require further, interdisciplinary work.
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Essay to all inchoate technologies, not even to a representative
array. I used copyright regulation on the Internet to illustrate
some of the key points and referred to others, including a more or
less choate field of science, biochemistry, and a very inchoate one,
nanotechnology, in the text.164
Hopefully, the vast, interdisciplinary inquiry of technology
regulation pitfalls outlined in this Essay will have shed light on
useful questions even if the reader does not agree with the
suggested answers, the method, the proposed model, or indeed
the underlying analytical grid. I welcome feedback on the
possible value of the model and approach.
164. See supra notes 20, 120 (discussing various uses of the term "inchoate" and
suggesting that inchoate technologies are far from completely developed).
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